We discuss the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence.
Introduction
What appears to be a central characteristic of commonsense knowledge is the possibility of nonmonotonicity. By this we mean that the addition of knowledge may cause us to withdraw some previously made inference.
In this paper, we look at the theory of evidence (Demp 1967 & Shafer 1976 ) and particularly the process of normalization. We show that this process introduces an inherent nonmonotonicity into the Dempster-Shafer framework. This inherent nonmonotonicity, we feel, makes this representation scheme a suitable one for the representation of default knowledge. We then show how the belief structure provides a formalism for representing commonsense knowledge.
Information and Monotonicity in the Theory of Evidence
In this section, we introduce a number of issues related to the information contained in a belief structure and provide a concept of monotonicity for the belief structures.
Assume m is a belief structure on the set X. Basically the information contained in a belief structure consists of knowledge about the probabilities of events in X. This view is very much in the spirit of Dempster's original work. We note that the essential feature of the belief structure is that the information it contains about the probabilities is generally imprecise (lacks specificity).
Given the belief structure m for any subset A of X, the probability of A is known to satisfy the following inequality.
Bel(A) � Prob(A) � Pl(A). For a given event A, we can use the term r A = Pl(A) -Bel(A) to measure the uncertainty associated with our knowledge of the probability of A. If r A = 0 then we exactly know the probability of A. Shafer calls a belief structure in which r A = 0, for all A, a Bayesian belief structure. This type of structure requires that the focal elements be all singletons. It is essentially the classical probability structure.
In order to motivate and justify the work that follows, we make the following simple observation. Assume then it naturally follows that
for any a2 � a 1 and b 2 � b1.
Put another, way given that Prob(A) E [a l , btl we can infer that Prob(A) E [a2, b 2 J· We note that the second interval is wider, less specific, but still valid. In the above we note that [a 1 ,b 1 J c [a2,b2] .
This observation provides the basis for the introduction of an inference among belief structures which was introduced by Yager ( 1 986).
Assume m 1 and m2 are two belief structures on X such that for every subset A of X the following condition is satisfied
If the above condition holds then it follows that know l edge that m 1 is true allows us to infer that m2 is true . A more general formulation of this result is possible . Def.: Assume m1 is a belief structure in which A1, ... A p are the focal elements with weights m(Aj) = a 1. Let m2 be another belief structure in which the focal elements can be represented as In this situation we say that m1 entails m2 and denote this as Yager (1986) proves the following result. Theorem: If then for every subset A rn1 c m2.
As a result of this theorem we can see that if m 1 c m2 then the knowledge that m 1 is a valid description of the world allows us to infer that m2 is also true . We can see that if m 1 c m2 then m 1 t-m2. We can say that if m1 c m2 m1 is a more specific representation.
We should note that the process of gaining knowledge in the D-S framework can be seen as obtaining more specific belief functions as the representation of our knowledge.
In logic the concept of monotonicity plays a fundamental role. It essentially is a manifestation of the fact that the gaining of knowledge allows us to know mo re about the world.
Assume P1, P2, ... P n are a collection of propositions from which we can deduce the proposition H, we denote this as (P l . P2, ... P n ) I-H The situation is considered to be monotonic if the addition of any proposition , Pn + 1, still allows us to infer H, that is (Pl, Pz, P n , P n +l) t-H The environment is called non-monotonic if the addition of some proposition may require us to withdraw the validity of H .
We are now in a position to introduce an analogous concept of monotonicity in the Dempster-Shafer framework. In the Dempster-Shafer framework the role of propositions a_re played by belief structures. Assume m 1, mz, ... m q are a collection of belief structures. The process of reasoning in this framework consists of the aggregation (conjunction) of pieces of evidence. In particular if
where m is any belief structure such that * m em. Thus in the D-S framework we can infer any belief structure which contains (is entailed by) the intersection of the constituent belief structures. We shall say that the situation is monotonic if for any additional ffiq+ 1, the conjunction satisfies
This concept of monotonicity is based upon the fact that, if m + e m * then from m + we can use the entailment principle to infer any belief structure inferred by m * .
We should note that the view taken in this Dempster-Shafer approach is essentially a generalization of the mode l theoretic approach in logic. In that view we associate with any proposition P i a set S i of possible worlds that are true under P i . Then * S =Strl ... S q are the worlds acceptable to all the propositions. A proposition H is inferable if the set of possible worlds, S H , that make H true satisfies * S cS H .
Normalization and NonMMonotonicity
In this section we shall investigate the reasoning process in the Dempster-Shafer theory, the conjunction of pieces of evidence, in regards to its satisfying the previously described monotonicity condition. We shall show that in general monotonicity is not always guaranteed in the Dempster Shafer framework. More specifically, when the aggregation of evidence has conflicts , focal elements that have null intersection, then a nonmonotonicity is introduced. On the other hand if there is no conflicts amongst the evidence, then monotonicity is guaranteed. Thus it is generally !lQl the case that mtr1m2cm1, only when there is no conflicts does the result hold.
The following example will help illustrate the issues. Assume that m 1 and m2 are two belief structures such that
«1> the aggregation of these two pieces of evidence results in the belief structme m where
We note in this case that as well as
The fact that Thus we see that if no conflicts arise the reasoning process is monotonic. An implication of this observation is that, as we obtain more information, in terms of additional belief structures, which doesn't conflict with what we already have then our overall knowledge increases. This follows since our ranges, the r A 's get smaller. In the case in which conflicts arise between focal elements the situation becomes different. If we consider the previous example but with the case in which A n B = <I> then we get 
The process exhibits a nonmonotonicity. Thus it appears the introduction of conflict and the requirement for normalization introduces a nonmonotonicity into the process.
As a first step in reducing this non-monotonicity we may try to use a different process for normalization then that used in Dempster's rule. We note that Dempster's rule essentially allocates the weights in the conflict set proportionately amongst the non conflicting focal elements. Dubois and Prade(1988) provide a comprehensive discussion of the issue of normalization in the aggregation of belief structures. In that paper they discuss a number of alternative procedures for aggregation. We shall look at a number of these and see their effect on the monotonicity issue.
One alternative approach to normalization was suggested by Yager(l987) . In this approach instead of proportionately distributing the conflict amongst all the focal elements we give it all to the base set X. Thus using this approach we get when A n B = cl> . .
Pl+(A) = 1 -a�= a+
Bel+(A) =a�= b+ Since b+ = b * and a+= a* the situation is the same as in the previous method and the nonmonotonicity still exists.
A third approach consists of applying a type of weighted averaging which essentially corresponds to a discounting. In this approach we calculate mo = cml + (1 -c)m2 It can be shown that this approach still doesn't reduce the nonmonotonicity.
Is there any procedure we can use that will reduce the nonmonotonicity? Essentially we see that the issue is that we must assign the conflict weight a� in a manner which brings up the Bel(A) to a. and thus the situation is monotonic. However the price we pay for this is that Pl(X)-:�: 1 . We can consider a more general rule for the intersection offocal elements in the Dempster's rule. Assume A and B are two focal elemen ts from m 1 and m2 then we define their conjunction as
In the above the function F(A,B) results in some subset of X. In all case when Poss(B/ A) == 1 we get An B. When Poss(B/A) = 0 the value depends upon the choice of F.
In particular if we set but not m1 nm2 cm2. This last approach introduces an idea of priority. It can be seen as a form of discounting, where m 2 is discounted if it conflicts with m 1 otherwise we don't discount it.
Default Knowledge in Belief Structures
In this section we show that the appearance of the nonmonotonicity rather than being a problem provides a natural facility for introducing default knowledge in the framework of belief structures.
Assume V is a variable that takes its value in the set X. Assume we have two pieces of knowledge with respect to V. The first an absolute and the second a typical piece of knowledge:
P1: Vis A P2: typically V is B.
As discussed by Yager(1987b) , essentially what we desire to happen in this case is that, if A n B :t:. <b we obtain A n B as our inference. If they don't intersect we discount the default knowledge and are left with A. We shall see that the reasoning mechanism in the theory of evidence essentially provides this capability. Yager(fo Appear) has suggested that one can represent a statement like typicall y V is B by a belief structure where m2(B)=a m 2 (X) = 1 -a where a is close to one. The idea being that by typical knowledge we are saying that there is a high probability that V lies in the set B but some small chance it can be anywhere.
Thus the above knowledge base can be represented in the Dempster-Shafer framework as two belief structures m 1 and m2. Where
Taking the conjunction of these two pieces of information we get m=m1 nm2. So that we get, as desired, that there is a high probability that V lies in An B.
On the other hand if A n B = <1> and we use Dempster's normalization process we get m(A) = 1.
Thus we see that we get the desired result that the typical knowledge is completely discounted when a conflict with absolute knowledge arises.
Priorities and Strengths of Defaults
We next consider the case in which we have two pieces of default knowledge: P1: typicall y Vis A P2: typically V is B
In addressing this problem by one of the logical extension type methods we are faced with the issue of priority amongst the default rules. In particular if one of the default rules has a higher priority it is introduced first in the deduction process. If A n B -J:. <1> no problems arise and we infer A n B. If A n B = <1> and if P1 is considered to have a higher priority then we should infer A.
While if P2 is considered to have a higher priority we should infer B. If P1 and P2 are considered to have some priority we should get a different result which is essentially the union of the two. Subsequently we shall see that the role of priority in the D-S framework is played by the probability assigned to the default set in each case.
We can represent the above knowledge base by two belief structures m1 and m2 where
In this representation we can see that a essentially describes the strength of the first default rule since Bel(A) :::: : a. That is a measures how cenain we are that A holds.
In the above example our inferred belief structure is If A n B -J:. <Il then we get
In this case thus m::: m1 nm2
Pl(A n B) = 1 Bel(A n B):::: : aj3
Since both a and J3 are very close to one this result essentially says that the inferred value for V is A n B. Since both A and B have small probabilities we can use the entailment principle to replace the above by m(A n B)= af3 m(X) = 1 -af3
This essentially says that we get typically A n B with a little less strength.
If A n B = q, then we get
Let us consider the case in which P 1 is a stronger default rule then P2, a> (3. This essentially corresponds to P 1 having a priority over P 2 . In the above since Bel(A) = aj3/(1 -af3) Bel(B) = 0:13/(1 -aj3) and with a> 13 it follows that aj3 > 0:13 we see that Bel(A) > Bel(B). The actual distinction depends upon the values for a and 13, the strengths of the defaults. Thus there is a high probability that V lies in A and a small chance that V lies in B. In addition Prob(A U B) � .98
In the case when P1 and P2 have the same strength (priority) then a= J3. In this case m(A) = aUJ(1 -a2) m(B) = a(i/(1 -a 2 ) m(X) = aUJ(l -a2)
In this case the belief and plausibility of A and B are equal. Essentially what this implies is that we can always hedge, make less the degree of typicality, and still be correct.
